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lol captain tripps
You need to be VERY carefull what you say. The above is so wrong it should be retracted.
People die of the flu yes but the death rate is a mere fraction of what SARs was and Avian flu. IF this is the big one we have been waiting for there could be a 50% death rate or higher for those who catch it. Think about that for a minute.
Further more regular flu kills the very young and unhealthy, some of these new strains are killing the young and healthy by using their own immune systems against them.
So before spouting drivel educate oneself so one can speak somewhat compitantly.
This is not good news if a new virus has mutated and is now spreading human to human. We all should be outright concerned about this. IF it does go pandemic washing your hands is not going to save you.
http://www.getpandemicready.org/
http://www.cdc.gov/swineflu/investigation.htm
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/en/index.html
http://www.fluwikie.com/
http://newfluwiki2.com/
Skam
Exceprt from:Could a 1918-like Pandemic Appear Again? If So, What Could We Do About It?
In its disease course and pathologic features, the 1918 pandemic was different in degree, but not in kind, from previous and subsequent pandemics. Despite the extraordinary number of global deaths, most influenza cases in 1918 (>95% in most locales in industrialized nations) were mild and essentially indistinguishable from influenza cases today. Furthermore, laboratory experiments with recombinant influenza viruses containing genes from the 1918 virus suggest that the 1918 and 1918-like viruses would be as sensitive as other typical virus strains to the Food and Drug Administration–approved antiinfluenza drugs rimantadine and oseltamivir.
However, some characteristics of the 1918 pandemic appear unique: most notably, death rates were 5–20 times higher than expected. Clinically and pathologically, these high death rates appear to be the result of several factors, including a higher proportion of severe and complicated infections of the respiratory tract, rather than involvement of organ systems outside the normal range of the influenza virus. Also, the deaths were concentrated in an unusually young age group. Finally, in 1918, 3 separate recurrences of influenza followed each other with unusual rapidity, resulting in 3 explosive pandemic waves within a year's time (Figure 1). Each of these unique characteristics may reflect genetic features of the 1918 virus, but understanding them will also require examination of host and environmental factors.
Until we can ascertain which of these factors gave rise to the mortality patterns observed and learn more about the formation of the pandemic, predictions are only educated guesses. We can only conclude that since it happened once, analogous conditions could lead to an equally devastating pandemic.
Like the 1918 virus, H5N1 is an avian virus (39), though a distantly related one. The evolutionary path that led to pandemic emergence in 1918 is entirely unknown, but it appears to be different in many respects from the current situation with H5N1. There are no historical data, either in 1918 or in any other pandemic, for establishing that a pandemic "precursor" virus caused a highly pathogenic outbreak in domestic poultry, and no highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus, including H5N1 and a number of others, has ever been known to cause a major human epidemic, let alone a pandemic. While data bearing on influenza virus human cell adaptation (e.g., receptor binding) are beginning to be understood at the molecular level, the basis for viral adaptation to efficient human-to-human spread, the chief prerequisite for pandemic emergence, is unknown for any influenza virus. The 1918 virus acquired this trait, but we do not know how, and we currently have no way of knowing whether H5N1 viruses are now in a parallel process of acquiring human-to-human transmissibility. Despite an explosion of data on the 1918 virus during the past decade, we are not much closer to understanding pandemic emergence in 2006 than we were in understanding the risk of H1N1 "swine flu" emergence in 1976.
Even with modern antiviral and antibacterial drugs, vaccines, and prevention knowledge, the return of a pandemic virus equivalent in pathogenicity to the virus of 1918 would likely kill >100 million people worldwide. A pandemic virus with the (alleged) pathogenic potential of some recent H5N1 outbreaks could cause substantially more deaths.
Whether because of viral, host or environmental factors, the 1918 virus causing the first or ‘spring' wave was not associated with the exceptional pathogenicity of the second (fall) and third (winter) waves. Identification of an influenza RNA-positive case from the first wave could point to a genetic basis for virulence by allowing differences in viral sequences to be highlighted. Identification of pre-1918 human influenza RNA samples would help us understand the timing of emergence of the 1918 virus. Surveillance and genomic sequencing of large numbers of animal influenza viruses will help us understand the genetic basis of host adaptation and the extent of the natural reservoir of influenza viruses. Understanding influenza pandemics in general requires understanding the 1918 pandemic in all its historical, epidemiologic, and biologic aspects.
Dr Taubenberger is chair of the Department of Molecular Pathology at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Rockville, Maryland. His research interests include the molecular pathophysiology and evolution of influenza viruses.
Dr Morens is an epidemiologist with a long-standing interest in emerging infectious diseases, virology, tropical medicine, and medical history. Since 1999, he has worked at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases.
This continual unsupported nay-saying grows tiring. We can all agree that much of what we see on the news is often twisted and rendered in a sensational light. "Don't believe everything you see on the 10 oclock news as the truth," yes. But this doesn't automatically mean that anything you see on the news has to be inherently false. If you don't believe the news, do the best research you can and come to your own conclusion. Don't just assume that because it's on the news, then OBVIOUSLY it's false and over-exaggerated. That just makes you a lemming of another category (and this is not directed at anyone in particular in this thread, I mean no offense).
The sad part is that it's so difficult to separate the truth from the sensationalism
This continual unsupported nay-saying grows tiring. We can all agree that much of what we see on the news is often twisted and rendered in a sensational light. "Don't believe everything you see on the 10 oclock news as the truth," yes. But this doesn't automatically mean that anything you see on the news has to be inherently false. If you don't believe the news, do the best research you can and come to your own conclusion. Don't just assume that because it's on the news, then OBVIOUSLY it's false and over-exaggerated. That just makes you a lemming of another category (and this is not directed at anyone in particular in this thread, I mean no offense).
Although we've been over this ad nauseam, I'll post this direct excerpt of a decent review/editorial (Capt, you've read this already). Humans survive and evolve because we think. Critically. I'm not saying you have to believe the following on faith, but it should provide you with a little more information with which to come up with your own decision.
Exceprt from:
1918 Influenza: the mother of all pandemics.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16494711
An even more comprehensive paper (at least as far as I've been through it, Capt and Koyote, this one might interest you guys as well):
The 1918 influenza pandemic: insights for the 21st century.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17330793
If anyone can't get the PDFs for either, I will email them directly to you. And of course, these are only two out of a substantial amount of literature; you could probably find even better stuff if you have the time and interest to dig. My conclusion at this point, is that it could turn into something big, or it could turn into nothing. That's it.
And Kemsat, the antibacterial soap point you brought up is funny and also interesting. We might be better off if we got rid of consumer antibacterial soaps all together :thumbup: And as far as the media thing goes, capn tripps/tube neck indeed
I think the excerpt you quoted fails to take the last 90 years of medical advancements into account. If a flu with the same rate of infection and the same virulence got to an epidemic level in the US, I can virtually guarantee the mortality rates would be less than in 1918 solely because of the medical treatment available today. In other words, in order to see effects like that in 1918 it would require something much worse than than the influenza of 1918.
I think the excerpt you quoted fails to take the last 90 years of medical advancements into account. If a flu with the same rate of infection and the same virulence got to an epidemic level in the US, I can virtually guarantee the mortality rates would be less than in 1918 solely because of the medical treatment available today. In other words, in order to see effects like those in 1918 it would require something much worse than the influenza of 1918.
On the other hand, I'm not going to travel to Mexico anytime soon.
It's actually rather sickening. It's almost as if the newsies want this to turn into a certified international disaster of epic proportions just so that they can say: "See, we told you! You heard it hear first folks!"...
You could be right or you could be completely wrong. Propagule potential is higher today because of globalization that has lead to international travel. A virus of similar transmissivity could spread far faster today than it could in 1918. This ability to spread is not only country to country but also within countries as our urban centres are even more connected than the past. Couple this with population growth and the simple physical space between one possible host to the next has decreased, and we have a great platform for disease spread.
If our wonder medicines do not work as much as we hope than containment by isolation could still be difficult, although perhaps not impossible. What happens if our wonder cures actually do work but there are bottlenecks in their production, delivery and sustained manufacture? If viral transmission can outpace treatment than the problem will not contained. All of the factors: rate of spread, rapidity of on set of symptoms, ability to diagnose, isolate and contain and ability to treat/efficacy of treatment are important to risk management approaches. Assuming that treatment technologies improvements have negated the other parts of the equation is invalid particularly as s it is assumed that rate of spread is a constant which it is not.
So it seems as if really, the best way to approach this would be to focus on containment procedures rather than any wonder cure medical treatment post infection right? At the heart of the matter, the rate of spread, is what needs to be addressed. Blocking or inhibiting transmission would yield the best outcome, regardless of the medical treatments available (back full circle to the hand washing and staying away from others if you're sick ).
Yes and celibacy and non-drug use are the best ways to prevent HIV. Arguably those are easier containment strategies than being weary of every doorknob you encounter.
Spread and virulence are independent factors. An increased rate of spread does not effect virulence, however it can contribute to the possibility of overwhelming the supply of services and equipment that would normally be capable of successful treatment. IOW and as a hyperbole, if the virus infects 150 million people in 2 days the strain on the health care system could create vastly different effects than 150 million people being infected with an identical virus over a period of 2 months.You could be right or you could be completely wrong. Propagule potential is higher today because of globalization that has lead to international travel. A virus of similar transmissivity could spread far faster today than it could in 1918. This ability to spread is not only country to country but also within countries as our urban centres are even more connected than the past. Couple this with population growth and the simple physical space between one possible host to the next has decreased, and we have a great platform for disease spread.
Then the vast majority of people infected would suffer minor illness and make a full recovery anyway, just as they did in 1918. I don't see containment as really being a viable effort. People have attempted to contain casually infections disease for centuries and failed in all but the most remote locations. The fact that our current globalization compounds that problem makes efforts at containment a waste of time and resources with these kinds of disease. By the time you know about it its already outside of your containment area. I don't know what miracle cures you're referring to, but many modern medicines and treatments that are commonplace now would probably seem like miracles to people in 1918. Things like ventilators, antibiotics, antipyretics, fluid and electrolyte maintenance, and entire classes of pulmonary drugs. But you can come up with what ifs all day. What if the virus makes you grow an arm out of your ass? What if it turns people into flesh eating zombies? Yeah, those are silly, but it really doesn't matter when the what if is what if whatever your plan is doesn't work. Its endless.If our wonder medicines do not work as much as we hope than containment by isolation could still be difficult, although perhaps not impossible. What happens if our wonder cures actually do work but there are bottlenecks in their production, delivery and sustained manufacture? If viral transmission can outpace treatment than the problem will not contained. All of the factors: rate of spread, rapidity of on set of symptoms, ability to diagnose, isolate and contain and ability to treat/efficacy of treatment are important to risk management approaches. Assuming that treatment technologies improvements have negated the other parts of the equation is invalid particularly as s it is assumed that rate of spread is a constant which it is not.
I got reminded of an interesting fact earlier today.
There cannot be a vaccine for which there was no Virus. Hence, if the US has a functional vaccine for this "flu" one must deduce responsibility in some way shape or form.